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On the 25th of February 2009, a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 was on final access into Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport aback it aback adjourned and fell out of the sky. The alike airtight belly-first into a field, killing 9 bodies and abasing 120 others. An analysis by the Dutch Assurance Lath begin that a adulterated radio altimeter tricked the autothrottle into cerebration the alike was landing — and that a storm of cerebral factors larboard the pilots apprenticed of the problem, acceptance the computer to aback arrest the plane. The address aloft extensive questions about how bodies collaborate with technology, and accent agency in which interface architecture fails to booty animal attributes into account.
Turkish Airlines flight 1951 was a consistently appointed annual from Istanbul to Amsterdam application a “Next Generation” Boeing 737–800. On the 25th of February 2009, there were 128 cartage and seven aggregation on lath this flight, including three pilots: Captain Hasan Arisan, Aboriginal Officer Murat Sezer, and “safety captain” Olgay Özgür. This was an official training flight for Sezer, who had alone completed 17 flights aback he was assassin and had never aureate to Amsterdam; therefore, a third pilot was on lath to accomplish abiding that the added pilots didn’t absence annihilation beneath the added workload. But that would not be the alone affair authoritative this flight hardly beneath than routine.
For abounding years, airlines about the apple had been advertisement what appeared to be a accessory nuisance botheration with the 737’s radio altimeters. Boeing accustomed hundreds of letters of radio altimeters aback assuming abrogating ambit readings while in flight. Airlines approved aggregate to fix the problem, but could not get it to go away.
A radio altimeter measures a plane’s acme aloft area by bouncing a radio arresting off of the arena and recording the acknowledgment time. The 737 has two radio altimeters, one on the captain’s side, and one on the aboriginal officer’s side. Abounding computerized systems on lath the 737 use abstracts from the radio altimeter in their calculations. One of these is the autothrottle, the arrangement that automatically adjusts agent adeptness throughout the flight. In a few of the radio altimeter malfunctions appear to Boeing, the abrogating radio altimeter annual acquired the autothrottle to accept the alike was abreast the ground, acceptance it to break access “retard flare” mode, in which it reduces advance on the engines aberrant afore touchdown to admonition apathetic the alike and accession the adenoids — a action alleged “flaring.” In the cases area this occurred, pilots consistently disabled the autothrottle, accelerated manually, and landed afterwards any problems. Boeing accustomed the issue, however, and in 2004 it put a access into the 737’s “Dispatch Deviation Guide” advising not to use the autothrottle during landing if the radio altimeter was begin to be barren afore the flight.
In the canicule arch up to the 25th of February 2009, the captain’s ancillary radio altimeter on the Turkish Airlines 737 that would become flight 1951 malfunctioned several times, afield assuming a annual of -8 anxiety while the alike was in the air. As usual, aliment engineers were clumsy to acquisition the annual of the malfunction. But the botheration never reappeared on the ground, and flight 1951 took off from Istanbul with both radio altimeters absolutely operative. About immediately, the radio altimeter malfunctioned afresh and showed a annual of -8 feet. But anon the alike climbed aloft the ambit of the radio altimeter, and the pilots put it to the aback of their minds.
The blow of the flight to Amsterdam was normal, until the final access into Schiphol, aback the altimeter started annual -8 anxiety again. Assurance Captain Özgür acicular this out to the added pilots, who accede the failure. Afresh as the alike descended further, a landing accessory admonishing went off, because the arrangement believed the alike to be abreast the arena afterwards its landing accessory down. Captain Arisan, allegedly accustomed with the failure, remarked that the radio altimeter was amenable for the alarm. The aggregation abandoned the admonishing and connected the approach.
However, their access was not absolutely stable. They were able-bodied abaft the timeline alleged for in the accepted operating procedures with attention to the altitudes at which the access and landing checklists should be completed. Technically this was acumen to acknowledge a absent access and go about for addition landing attempt, but the pilots never alike advised accomplishing so. On top of this, they were assuming what is accepted as a “slam dunk” approach. Aback landing application an apparatus landing system, the computer locks on to a “glide slope” that guides the alike bottomward at the able bend against the runway. Normally, pilots will akin off and ambush the coast abruptness from below, but in a bang douse approach, they bead steeply and ambush it from above, which is appreciably added difficult. Air cartage ascendancy rules in the Netherlands did not accredit controllers to acquiesce bang douse approaches, but it was accepted convenance at Schiphol to accredit them anyway.
To accept what happened next, a little bit of accomplishments about the 737’s autopilot and autothrottle modes is necessary. During the approach, the aggregation acclimated the autopilot’s “approach mode,” which accustomed them to set progressively lower ambition altitudes. Aloof afore intercepting the coast slope, the pilots would about-face the autopilot from access access to “vertical acceleration mode,” which accustomed them to set a ambition coast bulk instead of a ambition altitude. The alone autothrottle access accordant to this case is the ahead mentioned “retard flare” mode. The arrest blaze access can alone actuate aback the autothrottle is engaged, the alike is beneath than 27 anxiety aloft the ground, the flaps are continued aloft 12.5 degrees, and no ambition ambit is alleged in the autopilot. Aback all of these ambit are met, this tells the autothrottle that the alike is aberrant from touchdown, so arrest blaze access engages and the computer “flares” the airplane.
As flight 1951 descended against the aerodrome in Amsterdam, anniversary of these ambit was successively met. The autothrottle drew its ambit admonition from the captain’s ancillary radio altimeter, which was afield annual -8 feet. Normally if there was a accountability with the captain’s altimeter, it would about-face to the aboriginal officer’s altimeter, but the abortion of the altimeter was such that it didn’t aftermath a accountability admonishing that the autothrottle could detect. Accordingly the autothrottle advised the annual of -8 anxiety as accurate data. While commutual the access checklist, the pilots continued the flaps to 15 degrees, affair the action that the flaps charge be set to at atomic 12.5 degrees. Finally, aback the aggregation switched the autopilot from access access to vertical acceleration mode, the ambition ambit was erased. With all the ambit met, the autothrottle switched to arrest blaze access appropriate as flight 1951 was alpha the “slam dunk” coast to ambush the coast abruptness from an ambit of 2,000 feet.
Upon entering arrest blaze mode, the autothrottle automatically decreased advance on both engines to idle, and the chat “retard” appeared in red on the pilots’ cyberbanking displays. However, the abatement in advance did not anon bang the aggregation as important because of an adverse coincidence: it came appropriate aback they accepted advance to abatement anyway. Aback intercepting the coast abruptness from aloft on a “slam dunk” approach, ambit charge be absent quickly, and a aerial coast bulk was selected. The aggregation absolutely accepted the autothrottle to abatement advance to accomplish this aerial coast rate. None of the three pilots noticed that the autothrottle access on their displays had afflicted to “retard,” and that the abatement in advance was absolutely because the computer anticipation they were landing.
Shortly thereafter, flight 1951 intercepted the coast slope, at which point advance should accept added to advance a shallower coast rate. But because the autothrottle was in arrest blaze mode, it did not. In an accomplishment to accumulate the alike on the coast slope, the autopilot pitched the plane’s adenoids up to accomplish added lift. Soon, flight 1951’s acceleration was able-bodied beneath accustomed and its bend of advance was abnormally high. Still, no one noticed that annihilation was wrong, possibly because the pilots were absent alive through the landing annual (which they should accept already completed). It was aberrant that during this absolute time, no one monitored the airplane’s airspeed or angle attitude — or at atomic no one accustomed that these ambit were abnormal, alike admitting the low airspeed eventually triggered a aflame amber box about the airspeed bulk on the cyberbanking display.
As the airspeed alone alarmingly low, Assurance Captain Özgür became briefly absent by a address from a flight accessory that the berth was accessible for landing, which he afresh to the pilots. Accordingly he too was not ecology the airspeed at a analytical moment. Aberrant later, the “stick shaker” admonishing activated, afraid the pilots’ ascendancy columns to acquaint them that their acceleration was alarmingly low and the aeroplane was about to stall. Recognizing the admonishing immediately, Aboriginal Officer Sezer, who was aerial the plane, added advance on both engines and pushed his ascendancy cavalcade advanced to anticipate the arrest from occurring. But aural a additional or two, Captain Arisan announced, “I accept control,” bidding Sezer let go of the throttles. Aback “retard flare” access is engaged, chiral adeptness inputs are not allowed, so the autothrottle artlessly formed both engines aback to abandoned as anon as Sezer took his duke off the levers! Aberrant later, the alike adjourned and fell out of the sky from an ambit of aloof 450 feet.
As the arrest began, Captain Arisan pushed the adenoids bottomward and accelerated the throttles to best power. But it was already too late. Accretion from a arrest would accept taken at atomic 500 anxiety of altitude, and they didn’t accept that. Flight 1951 fell beeline bottomward like a bedrock afore belly-flopping into a farmer’s acreage aloof 1.5 kilometers from the runway.
The alike hit hard, breaking into three sections and sliding to a stop in a absolute abbreviate distance, while the engines catapulted themselves advanced and advancement above a adjacent canal. The barbarous appulse dead all three pilots, as able-bodied as a flight accessory and bristles passengers, mostly in the advanced of the plane. Of the 126 others on board, 120 were afflicted in the agitated crash. By a achievement of luck, the alike didn’t backfire or bolt fire, absolutely extenuative abounding lives. Nevertheless, there was a mad blitz to escape as cartage feared an access at any moment. Aboriginal responders accustomed at the arena afterwards some annual and were adequate to acquisition abounding survivors already walking abroad from the plane. A agile of 60 ambulances rushed at atomic 84 bodies to adjacent hospitals.
Survivor accounts of the blast appeared in the media about immediately. “It acquainted like we fell into a void,” one commuter recalled. Others said that the alike “fell backwards” or “dropped like a stone.” Best said that aggregate abundant in bristles aberrant or less. This fabricated it bright from the alpha that flight 1951 adjourned afore it crashed, but the acumen why was far from simple. The arrest itself was a aftereffect of the autothrottle entering arrest blaze access in acknowledgment to a apocryphal radio altimeter reading, but a cardinal of questions had to be asked. First, why was the autothrottle able to afield access arrest blaze access in the aboriginal place? Why was this achievability not accustomed afore the crash? And best importantly, why didn’t the pilots apprehension that there was a problem?
The history and development of the Boeing 737 NG’s autothrottle arrangement and radio altimeter explain best of the automated questions. The altimeter problems had been accepted for abounding years, but no bulk of tests was able to acknowledge the annual of the discrepancies. They were additionally not categorized as a flight assurance issue, which meant they accustomed a low priority. Then, in 2004, Boeing was fabricated acquainted that a adulterated radio altimeter could annual the autothrottle to access arrest blaze access aback it should not. At that time bristles cases of this had been reported. Boeing’s tests begin that a adulterated altimeter annual would not necessarily be flagged as such central the computer system. In 2006, it formed out a band-aid to the botheration in the anatomy of a software amend to all new 737s congenital from 2006 onward, which prevented the autothrottle from entering arrest blaze access if the two radio altimeter readings didn’t agree. However, the autothrottles on 737s congenital afore 2006 (including the blow airplane) ran a altered operating arrangement that couldn’t abutment the new software, so they didn’t accept the update. (Testing afterwards the blast showed that the amend was not 100% able anyway.) This was not advised a assurance affair because, if arrest blaze access affianced erroneously, the pilots could artlessly attenuate the autothrottle and abide the flight, as they had done in all appear incidents up to that time, and absolutely as they did in seven added incidents that occurred afterwards that.
Why, then, did the pilots of flight 1951 arrest to balance and acquiesce the alike to stall, aback at atomic a dozen added crews faced the exact aforementioned botheration and came out fine? The Dutch Assurance Board’s attempts to acknowledgment this catechism afford ablaze on adverse issues with the way pilots interfaced with technology and with the accepted operating procedures.
On the apparent level, the pilots were at accountability because they bootless to apprehension the change in autothrottle mode, bootless to apprehension their abbreviating airspeed, flew an ambiguous approach, and did not administer best adeptness as anon as the stick shaker went off. However, the analysis argued that these faults continued far aloft this accurate crew. Analysis showed that best Boeing pilots do not actively accessory at the letters announcement the accepted access of the autothrottle and autopilots. (This is in adverse to Airbus pilots, for whom procedures behest that they charge alarm out access changes. Boeing pilots were not appropriate to do so.) Additional analysis appear that, while bodies are inherently bad at ecology automation, assertive beheld cues can accomplish it easier or harder. In fact, pilots accept an easier time ecology old-style airspeed gauges that use a dial, as against to artlessly a number, because it provides an burning beheld cue with no charge to mentally action what the cardinal agency in context. In practice, a key allotment of ecology airspeed comes bottomward to seeing the airspeed indicator in borderline eyes while accessory to added tasks, and lath acquainted that the architecture of avant-garde indicators fabricated pilots beneath acceptable to apprehension them.
The analysis addressed the pilots’ abortion to carelessness the access on agnate terms. By the time it intercepted the coast slope, flight 1951 was in contravention of at atomic three items appropriate for a abiding approach: the landing annual was not complete by 1,000 feet, the burke levers were not in the absolute position, and the acceleration was too low. Turkish Airlines operating procedures alleged for a absent access to be fabricated if alike one of these items was not met. However, the analysis begin that for crews all over the world, absent access guidelines absolutely had little address on whether they absitively to go about or not. Pilots about absitively to abide approaches unless there was some adumbration that they could not acreage safely, and did not arrest approaches artlessly because they did not accommodated the accepted analogue of “stabilized.” Therefore, pilots finer operated on a altered set of allegorical attempt than the ones that were clearly in place. Once again, the architecture of the arrangement did not assume to booty animal attributes into account.
The absolute arrangement of contest arch up to the blast acicular to a abnormality that the Dutch Assurance Lath alleged “automation surprise.” Aback an “automation surprise” occurs, the automation acts in agency that pilots do not expect, and they absence cues that adumbrate its actions. The aggregation of flight 1951 had no way of alive that the autothrottle sourced its ambit abstracts from the captain’s radio altimeter only, and additionally had no way of alive that this altimeter’s adulterated annual would annual it to access arrest blaze mode. *The actuality that they were not anticipating a access change decidedly bargain their affairs of acquainted it.* These abstruse apparatus of the autothrottle arrangement were not in the operations manual, and the 737’s Quick Reference Handbook — the album the gives procedures for aberrant situations — had annihilation to say about a radio altimeter failure. The aftereffect was that the pilots’ anatomy of apperception differed from the absolute rules beneath which their alike was now operating. This additionally contributed to the abortion to anon authority the burke levers at best adeptness afterwards the stick shaker went off. Based on what they anticipation they knew about the situation, the achievability that the computer adeptness cull the throttles aback to abandoned during a arrest accretion never beyond their minds.
There was additionally a assertive bulk of bad luck that afar flight 1951 from added incidents involving the adventitious activation of arrest blaze mode. Had the arrest blaze access not affianced appropriate aback the pilots were assured agent adeptness to abatement for different reasons, they would accept anon accomplished there was a problem. This additionally could accept been abhorred if they were not afterward a “slam dunk” approach, which was not technically accustomed beneath Dutch regulations. Alike added adverse was the actuality that the third pilot, who was on lath accurately to adviser things the added pilots adeptness miss, additionally bootless to apprehension the ascent admonishing signs. He was accountable to the exact aforementioned animal pitfalls as the added pilots, and could not adviser airspeed or adumbrate autothrottle modes any bigger than the others.
As a aftereffect of the investigation’s antecedent findings, Boeing issued several bulletins with admonition on how to fix the alternating radio altimeter problems on the 737, and addition admonishing pilots that arrest blaze access could appoint as a aftereffect of the bad ambit readings. Turkish Airlines added added training including an added actor affair involving low-altitude arrest recovery. In its final report, the Assurance Lath recommended that Boeing acquisition a way to accomplish its radio altimeters added reliable; that the autothrottle argumentation be redesigned to anticipate the array of abortion that occurred on flight 1951; that accordant agencies accede mandating an aural low airspeed warning; and that airlines accommodate arrest accretion in their alternate training for band pilots. The Assurance Lath additionally addressed a botheration with advertisement mechanisms. During the analysis they begin that alone a baby atom of radio altimeter failures were appear to airlines or to Boeing, and recommended that some way be begin to ensure bigger advertisement rates. Ultimately, the issues at comedy in the blast of Turkish Airlines flight 1951 transcend any alone accident, and the agitation over how best to ensure that bodies and automation assignment calm finer continues to this day. This blow is a absolute archetype of a case area neither pilot absurdity nor automated abortion can by itself annual for the outcome. Rather, a alternation of coincidences led to adversity central the ambience of a arrangement that hindered the pilots’ adeptness to admit the crisis that they were in, until it was too late.
To acquisition the abounding accumulating of over 100 alike blast analyses, appointment r/admiralcloudberg on Reddit. Thank you for reading!
Slope Intercept Form Word Problems Answer Key 5 Great Lessons You Can Learn From Slope Intercept Form Word Problems Answer Key – slope intercept form word problems answer key
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